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Abstract. Poor local information networks and weak
social sanctions in urban settings make joint liability
unable to guarantee high repayment rates to microlen-
ders. Yet, microcredit programmes in Western Europe
report good performance even if the majority of them
charges no collateral. We collect data from three Italian
microcredit institutions which operate in urban areas
by granting individual loans without collateral to single
entrepreneurs and teams (associations and cooperatives)
and we nd that teams repay with higher probability.
On this basis we develop a microlending instrument
that, like joint liability implemented in rural economies,
mitigates informational problems but, differently from
joint liability, ts the urban context for it reproduces
a cohesion among entrepreneurs based on a prot-
maximizing behavior and not on social capital.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Microcredit programmes provide nancial services to
small-scale entrepreneurs who otherwise lack access to
capital markets because they are not endowed with assets
to be pledged as collateral.
Empirical evidence shows that these unconventional
lenders have a reasonable degree of nancial self-
sufciency even if they target poor people who would
not be welcomed as customers by ordinary commercial
banks. One of the reasons for this success is the appli-
cation of joint liability: when informational asymmetry
between lenders and entrepreneurs is more severe than
among entrepreneurs themselves, this scheme of lending
is able to mitigate hidden information problems, inter
alia, without requesting any pecuniary collateral (for
exhaustive surveys see, e.g. Ghatak and Guinnane, 1999,
and Fedele, 2006).
Joint liability works as follows: entrepreneurs, who
differ in their ability to repay and work on distinct
projects, self-select into groups to get a loan. If the
group does not fully repay its obligations, then the
microlender cut off all members from future credit until
the debt is repaid, so that the successful entrepreneurs
are induced to help failing partners. If entrepreneurs
have perfect information about each other's type, then
joint liability drives the good ones to choose partners
of the same type, while the bad entrepreneurs have no
choice but to form groups with other bad ones: this
is called peer selection and enables the microlender to
screen out entrepreneurs. As a result, repayment rates
rise with respect to lending to individuals when no ex-
ante collateral is put up (Ghatak, 1999, 2000, Van Tassel,
1999; see also Guttman, 2008, who extends the peer
selection result by incorporating dynamic incentives).
This model of lending turns out to be effective in serving
clients who belong to rural communities, where networks
of local information are strong and peer pressure from
fellow villagers, like reputation loss of insolvent entre-
preneurs or restriction on access to inputs necessary for
the business, induces discipline in repayment.
2On the contrary, many experiences show that in urban
industrialized areas joint liability scheme may be a
poor t for potential clients. NEF (2004) and Viganò
et al. (2004) (henceforth NEF and Viganò) nd that
79% of the existing microcredit experiences in Western
Europe makes only individual loans, just 4% adopts
group lending with joint liability and 17% makes both
individual and group loans. This is motivated by the fact
that people who live in cities are less likely to know
each other, so that peer selection may not occur: Laffont
and N'Guessan (2000) show that repayment rates do
not increase with joint liability if entrepreneurs ignore
the ability of repayment of partners. Furthermore, social
sanctions are less important so that pressure to repay is
weaker and joint liability schemes become inappropriate
(Ghatak and Guinnane, 1999, Ciravegna 2006; see also
Gross and de Silva, 2002, for an empirical study of a
microcredit project in Albania, both rural and urban:
they observe that only the rural methodology is based
on group lending contracts).1
Interestingly, the institutions surveyed by NEF and
Viganò declare an average repayment rate of 90.3%,
which is high, even if the majority of them charges
neither joint liability nor collateral.2 Yet, the two reports
do not mention whether alternative lending schemes help
to maintain such positive results.3
To get a more detailed picture of features of micro-
credit programs in urban settings, we study the case
of three microlenders which operate in Northern Italian
1If microcredit in the poor world nds its reason to exist in the
need to alleviate poverty, the most important rationales for the spread
of microcredit in the developed world, where tax, legal, welfare,
employment and banking systems are different, are to create employ-
ment, integrate minority groups and increase female participation in
the workforce; microlending becomes thus a tool to increase social
inclusion, in contrast with the original view of the underdeveloped
countries where the main force leading to the successful repayment
of microloans is the strong social network (Anderloni, 2003; ILO,
2002).
2See Kugler and Oppes (2005) for a discussion, both theoretical
and empirical, of the ability of collateral to mitigate informational
problems in urban microcredit programmes with joint liability, where
social sanctions are too weak to serve the role of collateral substitutes.
3Armendáriz and Morduch (2000, 2003) and Tedeschi (2006),
inter alii, list a number of innovations in the microlending practice
that go beyond joint liability and help to maintain high repayment
rates also in places with scarce local information: among such
innovations, progressive lending, which is adopted by around 50% of
the institutions surveyed by NEF and Viganò, consists of granting an
initial small amount of money, whose size increases successively only
if the borrower demonstrates reliability (see also Giné et al., 2006, for
an experimental analysis). The scheme enables microlenders to screen
out the worst clients before taking additional risk by expanding loan
scale, but presents at least a disadvantage: when there is a multiplicity
of microlenders, borrowers who default on a loan can turn to another
nancial provider if there is poor information on credit histories, so
that threats to not be renanced lose vigor.
cities: MAG2 Milano, MAG4 Torino and MAG6 Reggio
Emilia. They make individual loans without requesting
collateral; MAG2 and MAG6 target two main categories
of entrepreneurs, single entrepreneurs and teams (asso-
ciations and cooperatives), whereas MAG4 focuses on
teams. Data on repayment rates reveal that teams are
less risky than single entrepreneurs.
In order to develop a deeper understanding of how mi-
crocredit contractual instruments should be designed to
t urban contexts, we construct the following theoretical
framework: a microcredit market is considered with hid-
den information à la De Meza and Webb (1987) and Laf-
font and N'Guessan (2000). Two types of entrepreneurs
are present who need funding to implement risky projects
and differ in their ability to produce output. Before
applying for loans, entrepreneurs decides simultaneously
whether (1) to perform the project individually, or (2) to
be disposed to constitute production teams, whose size
is exogenously xed by the nancial agreement. The
entrepreneurs knows only their own type: they live in
cities where people do not know each other.
Loans are granted by a microlender who requires no
collateral, knows the fractions of good and bad entre-
preneurs in the population, but ignores which specic
entrepreneur is of which type. Loans consist of different
lending schemes, that the microlender implements condi-
tional on the entrepreneurs' choice between alternatives
(1) or (2).4
If all entrepreneurs end up by carrying out the project
singularly, the microlender grants individual loans: we
call this mechanism Individual Lending scheme. If, in-
stead, all entrepreneurs are disposed to build teams, a
screening mechanism, which consists of two contracts
addressed to the teams and is named Production Team
Lending scheme, is proposed. The rst contract contains
a certain repayment and requires each team to adopt a
technology A, for which expected output is increasing
in the number of good members. The second contract
prescribes a higher repayment and the use of a technol-
ogy B, for which expected output is again increasing in
the number of good members, but higher than expected
output with technology A when all members are bad and
equal to when all members are good. Good entrepreneurs
prefer the rst contract for the associated repayment
is lower; bad entrepreneurs, who get lower expected
output when employing technology A, prefer the second
contract even if it entails a higher repayment. This
enables the microlender to discriminate between good
and bad entrepreneurs and overcome the informational
4Throughout the paper we refer to the microlender as he and to
each entrepreneur as she.
3problem.
Technologies A and B can be interpreted as two
different ways of organizing tasks within each team,
the rst one penalizing bad entrepreneurs. Such different
ways do not necessarily depend on the industry the teams
decide to enter. An appropriate, but not unique, example
of technology that penalizes bad entrepreneurs may be
the O-ring technology (Kremer, 1993), for which whole
team fails if at least one member fails. This technology
requires expected output to be increasing and convex in
the number of good members, thereby describing so-
phisticated multitasking production processes, for which
mistakes in any of the tasks can dramatically reduce
the output's value. On the contrary, a technology with
success probability linearly increasing in the number of
good members represents less sophisticated processes
and can be a proper example of Technology B.
When, nally, some entrepreneurs are disposed to
form teams and others perform the project individually,
lending mechanism is called Mixed Lending and consists
of a different pair of contracts. The rst one is addressed
to the teams: it contains a repayment and requires the
teams to adopt technology B. The second contract is
designed for single entrepreneurs and species a higher
repayment due by them only if successful. We show that,
also in this case, the microlender discriminates between
good entrepreneurs, who select the rst contract, and bad
ones, who prefer the second contract.
We solve the two-stage Bayesian game played by the
entrepreneurs when they rst choose between alterna-
tives (1) or (2) and then select one of the contracts of
the lending mechanism proposed by the microlender.
We nd a pure-strategy Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium
where all good entrepreneurs end up by constituting
teams among them, while all bad ones stay alone; Mixed
Lending is implemented by the microlender, the teams
adopt technology B and repay with higher probability
than single bad entrepreneurs.
Our results suggest that targeting teams may represent
a good microlending strategy in urban areas where no
collateral is put up and social sanctions are weak. Indeed,
when building production teams entrepreneurs partici-
pate in a common project and are focused on its success,
thereby being likely to join partners with high ability of
producing output and to reproduce a cohesion typical of
joint liability schemes, but based on a prot-maximizing
behavior and not on social capital. For these reasons, our
instrument may represent an useful alternative to joint
liability in urban developed settings, where networks of
local information are highly fragmented and social ties
are weak. Moreover, the problem of competition among
microlenders is not related to our scheme, since it does
not entail threats of future denied access to credit (see
Note 3).
Our model also offers a possible explanation of the
good performance of teams among MAGs' clients. Data
on the businesses performed by associations and co-
operatives served by MAGs suggest that they devote
themselves mainly to cultural activities, on-the-job train-
ing activities, production and sale of biological goods
and health, social and insurance services. Accepting
the hypothesis that such activities require sophisticated
production processes does not seem sensible, hence
associations and cooperatives can be properly repre-
sented by teams that adopt technology B. In this case
the equilibrium scenario explains the empirical nding
according to which teams turn out to be less risky than
single entrepreneurs, by arguing that the latter counts
only good entrepreneurs, while single entrepreneurs are
bad and repay with lower probability.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows.
Section II provides further details of NEF and Viganò
surveys. In Section III we carry out the analysis of the
data. The basic model is laid out in Section IV. Sections
V, VI and VII present Individual Lending, Production
Team Lending and Mixed Lending schemes, respectively.
Section VIII studies the equilibrium and Section IX
concludes.
II. MICROCREDIT IN WESTERN EUROPE
The development of microcredit in Europe has been
quite widespread in the last decades but with different
features compared to the original idea of Muhammad
Yunus, based on joint liability.
The literature concerning European industrialised
countries is still limited with two relevant surveys as
cornerstones of the existing work, the aforementioned
NEF and Viganò, which help to understand the current
state of microcredit in Europe: 30 organisations were
contacted by NEF and 32 by Viganò, with an overlapping
of 11 that leads to a total of 51 interviews. 59% of the
institutions do not ask collateral for the loan and only
44% provide non-nancial support services. Microcredit
experiences can be found in many countries in West-
ern Europe (Ireland, Spain, Portugal, Belgium, Finland,
Italy, Germany, United Kingdom, France, Sweden and
Norway) and, given the contrasting legal and regulatory
environment, they seem to assume different institutional
forms. The most common are cooperatives (31%) and
foundations (25%), followed by non-bank nancial in-
stitutions (19%), NGOs (9%), associations (9%) and
banks (7%). As mentioned above, 79% of the surveyed
organisations make only individual loans, 4% only group
4loans and 17% make both individual and group loans; the
greatest coverage and outreach is taking place in France
with 52.7% of the loans made by all the microlenders,
followed by Finland with 27.3%; 90% of the microcredit
institutions give loans for start-up of entrepreneurial
activities. Some other relevant statistical ndings by NEF
and Viganò concern the nancial characteristics of the
loans: the average loan size is e 12500, with average
loans terms of 33 months and interest rates that range
from a minimum of 0% to a maximum of 19.5%, with
an average of 6.8%. Finally, repayment rates range from
a minimum of 50% to a maximum of 100%, with an
average of 90.3%.
III. THE ITALIAN MAGS: DATA ANALYSIS
While reviewing the existing literature on microcre-
dit we became immediately aware of the lack of a
unique and clear denition of microcredit, especially in
industrialised countries where many institutions tend to
call themselves microlenders every time they lend sums
below e 25000, requiring both pecuniary and personal
collateral. Therefore our rst step was to choose an
unambiguous denition of microcredit institution as an
organization that lends money to active poor for start-
up of business activity without asking any pecuniary
collateral and provides support services to allow the
entrepreneur to make the loan fruitful.5
In Italy the institution that better ts our requirements
and have pioneered the development and diffusion of
microcredit already from the end of 1970s is MAG
(Mutua Autogestita), a national entity divided in six
regional groups with ofces in Verona, Milano, Torino,
Venezia, Reggio Emilia and Roma; of these only three
provide loans to business activities: MAG2 Milano,
MAG4 Torino and MAG6 Reggio Emilia. The rst MAG
was created in 1978 in Verona in order to satisfy the in-
creasing need for new nancial tools to support projects
with a social implications that would not otherwise
get funds in the traditional nancial markets. MAGs are
Cooperatives or, as they prefer to dene themselves, self-
sustainable societies of people that save and use private
capital to nance fruitful projects. They are therefore au-
thorised by the members to lend money to other members
with favorable interest rates and repayment conditions,
providing support services and without requiring any
pecuniary collateral.
5Gonzalez-Vega (1998) denes active poor as those people who,
even if living in poverty, prove to be technically skilled to such
a degree as to enable them to develop, and autonomously run, an
economic activity, or to at least produce a constant ow of resources
which can be used for repayment of debt or for savings.
The analysis of the data available from the three
MAGs is based on 399 loans for start-up of business
activities. By September 2005 the three MAGs had
provided 335 loans to teams and 64 to individuals;
88.7% of the loan contracts were already expired. The
majority of loans (84%) are given to teams: this re-
calls MAG's original objective of nancing organizations
with strong participation of workers and investors in
the business activity. It is worth remarking that MAG2
and MAG6 target both single entrepreneurs and teams,
whereas MAG4 focuses only on the latter. We study the
difference between loans to single entrepreneurs and to
teams (associations and cooperatives) both in terms of
average repayment rates and average interest rates. The
repayment rate is dened as the amount repaid at time
t divided by the amount due at time t. We also test the
difference in repayment rates between individuals and
teams for statistical signicance by means of statistics
based on a binomial distribution. We nally compute
the average amount of the loans in euros (this statistic
was not available for MAG6). Table 1 collects the data
on average amounts, interest and repayment rates.
TABLE 1. MAGS DATA: AVERAGE REPAYMENT AND
INTEREST RATES
Single Entrepreneurs
MAG2 MAG4 MAG6 Total
Observations 46 / 18 64
Amount (e) 4067 / n.a. /
Repayment Rate 66.5% / 65% 66%
Interest Rate 8.9% / 10.1% 9.3%
Associations
MAG2 MAG4 MAG6 Total
Observations 89 35 44 168
Amount (e) 11966 29111 n.a. /
Repayment. Rate 66.8% 92.2% 77.9% 75%
Interest Rate 9.4% 8.5% 10.3% 9.4%
Cooperatives
MAG2 MAG4 MAG6 Total
Observations 70 91 6 167
Amount (e) 18952 49185 n.a. /
Repayment Rate 72.8% 88.4% 83.3% 81.7%
Interest Rate 8% 8.6% 9.3% 8.4%
P-Values for the Difference in Repayment Rates
between Individuals and Teams
MAG2 MAG4 MAG6 Total
P 0.33 / 0.98 1.01
Table 1 suggests that lending to teams is unambigu-
ously less risky than lending to individuals. Indeed,
since P < 1:96 in all cases we cannot reject the null
hypothesis: the difference in repayment rates between
5individuals and teams is signicant. Instead, we nd no
strong evidence that cooperatives are better clients than
associations, even if the total average repayment rate is
higher for the former.
Table 2 contains data on the activities performed by as-
sociations and cooperatives.6 Category Other contains
a huge and heterogeneous set of businesses. Category
Unknown considers all the teams for which there is
no information.
TABLE 2. MAGS DATA: ACTIVITIES PERFORMED BY
THE TEAMS
Associations
MAG2 MAG4 MAG6 Total
Observations 89 35 44 168
Cultural Activities 16.9% 74.3% 34.1% 33.3%
On-the-Job Training 12.4% 0 0 6.5%
Other 34.8% 22.9% 27.3% 30.4%
Unknown 36% 2.9% 38.6% 29.8%
Cooperatives
MAG2 MAG4 MAG6 Total
Observations 70 91 6 167
Cultural Activities 2.9% 8.8% 0% 6%
On-the-Job Training 4.3% 36.3% 0 21.6%
Other 60% 54.9% 83.3% 58.1%
Unknown 32.9% 0 16.7% 14.4%
The majority of the teams devote themselves to cul-
tural activities, on-the-job training activities and other
activities (like health, insurance and social services and
production and sale of biological goods).
The remainder of the paper develops the theoretical
framework.
IV. THE MODEL
Consider an urban microcredit market with N = 4
wealthless risk-neutral entrepreneurs of two different
types. There are two type  = H entrepreneurs endowed
with productive projects which yield A with probability
pH = 1. Risky projects of the two type  = L entrepre-
neurs yield A with probability pL = p, 0 < p < 1, and
zero otherwise. Throughout the paper we refer to type
H(L) entrepreneurs as good (bad). Each project requires
one unit of capital. Money is provided by a risk-neutral
microlending institution. Opportunity cost of labor is
equal to 0, while  > 1 is per unit opportunity cost
of capital. The two values represent reservation prots
of entrepreneurs and microlender, respectively.
Before obtaining funding, the entrepreneurs decide
whether (1) to carry out the project singularly, or (2) to
6Unfortunately, no data were available on the activities performed
by the single entrepreneurs.
be disposed to form production teams. Teams must count
n = 2 members. The entrepreneurs know only their own
type; the microlender knows that half entrepreneurs are
type H and the other half are type L, but ignores which
specic entrepreneur is of which type.
If an entrepreneur performs the project singularly, as
specied above, she needs one unit of capital as nancial
input: if the entrepreneur is good output is equal to
A; if she is bad, expected output is pA. If teams are
built, each one needs two units of capital as nancial
input and expected output depends not only on the
entrepreneurs' type, but also on the technology the teams
avail themselves of, as we will see below.
After the microlender has observed the entrepreneurs'
choice between (1) and (2), he proposes different lending
schemes conditional on three possible situations: (a) at
most one entrepreneur is disposed to form a team, in
which case the microlender implements a mechanism
which we refer to as Individual Lending (henceforth
IL); (b) the four entrepreneurs are disposed to constitute
a team, then the scheme proposed by the microlender
is named Production Team Lending (henceforth PT L);
two or three entrepreneurs are disposed to build a team,
in which case the scheme is called Mixed Lending
(henceforth ML). Each scheme consists in a pair of
loan contracts: with IL, resp. PT L, both contracts are
designed for the single entrepreneurs, resp. teams; with
ML one contract is addressed to the team and the second
one to the single entrepreneurs. Detailed features of the
three mechanisms are delineated in Sections V, VI and
VII.
A. Timing and Game
Timing of the model is as follows.
1) At t = 0, Nature draws a type vector & from the
set (&1; &2; &3; &4; &5; &6), where &1 = (H;H;L; L),
&2 = (H;L;H;L), &3 = (H;L;L;H), &4 =
(L;H;H;L), &5 = (L;H;L;H) and &6 =
(L;L;H;H), according to prior probability distri-
bution (&) which assigns probability 1=6 to the
draw of every vector.
2) At t = 1, Nature reveals  i,  = H;L, to
entrepreneur i, i = 1; 2; 3; 4, but not to any other
entrepreneur nor to the microlender.
3) At t = 2, the entrepreneurs decide simultaneously
whether to carry out the project individually or to
be disposed to constitute production teams.
4) At t = 3, the microlender proposes one of the three
above lending schemes; the entrepreneurs, who
have no time preference, decide simultaneously
whether to choose one of the two contracts, in
6which case they obtain funds and invest, or not
to apply;
5) At t = 4, output is produced: the single entre-
preneurs and/or the teams repay according to the
contractual scheme they accept at t = 3; when
teams are formed each member is supposed to be
entitled to an amount 1=2 of team output.
We analyze the two-stage Bayesian game among
entrepreneurs at t = 2; 3 by restricting our attention
to pure-strategy Perfect Bayesian Equilibria (PBE).7 At
t = 2 any entrepreneur i selects an action from the
set A = fS; Tg, where S indicates performing the
project singularly and T being disposed to build a team.
Entrepreneur i knows only her type and her interim
beliefs about the type of any entrepreneur  i are com-
puted using Bayes' rule: i ( i =  i j i ) = 1=3 and
i ( i 6=  i j i ) = 2=3. Prior beliefs of the microlender
about entrepreneur i's type also derive from Bayes' rule:
m( i = H) = m( i = L) = 1=2, where subscript m
stands for microlender.
There are 2N possible combinations of the rst-stage
actions, whose outcome is dened only when at most
one entrepreneur plays T : in this case all entrepreneurs
end up by staying alone and the microlender offers IL.
Indeed, if only one entrepreneur decides to form a team,
she is not able to nd a partner.
At t = 3 the microlender and the entrepreneurs
observe the rst-stage actions. For simplicity we ne-
glect entrepreneurs's admissible choice of refusing both
contracts of any scheme: as we will see below, entre-
preneurs' participation is implied by a limited liability
constraint contained in all the contracts.
When IL is proposed by the microlender, at t = 3
any entrepreneur i chooses an action from the set CIL =
fRIL1 ;RIL2g, where IL1, resp. IL2, denotes IL's rst,
resp. second, contract, and RIL1 , resp. RIL2 , accepting
IL1, resp. IL2.
Instead, when at t = 3 all entrepreneurs play T the
microlender executes PT L: any entrepreneur i chooses
an action from the set CPTL = fRPTLA ;RPTLBg,
where PTLA, resp. PTLB , denotes PT L's rst, resp.
second, contract, and RPTLA , resp. RPTLB , accepting
PTLA, resp. PTLB . There are 2N possible combina-
tions of actions RPTLA and RPTLB , whose outcome
is designed as follows. Two teams are built if (a) all
entrepreneurs choose the same contract (either PTLA
or PTLB); (b) two entrepreneurs choose one contract
and the other two the second contract. On the contrary,
7The microlender is also a player, whose actions consist in
constructing the lending schemes. Yet, as we will see below, he
designs them so as to minimize his prots: his role simply consists
in determining the (maximum) entrepreneurs' payoffs.
if three entrepreneurs choose one contract and just one
player selects the second, then the latter and one of
the other three players are not able to team up for
they are opting for different contracts: only one team is
built between two over the three entrepreneurs choosing
the same nancial agreement, while two players get
no funding because PTLA and PTLB are designed
exclusively for teams. All entrepreneurs playing T at
t = 2 is hence a necessary but not sufcient condition
to build two teams.
Finally, when two or three entrepreneurs select T ,
ML is offered and the design of the subgame is based
on the following hypothesis: if an entrepreneur plays
S, resp. T , then for consistency she is not allowed
to select a contract designed for teams, resp. singles.
In symbols any entrepreneur who plays S, resp. T , at
t = 2 selects an action from the set CMLS = fRMLSg,
resp. CMLT = fRMLT g, where RMLS , resp. RMLT
denotes accepting contract MLS , resp. MLT , addressed
to the single entrepreneurs, resp. to the team. Yet and
again, selecting T is not a sufcient condition to form
a team when three entrepreneurs make such a choice;
indeed, one of them stays alone because teams must
count 2 members. The following scenario may therefore
occur: an entrepreneur plays T , but CMLT = f?g
because contract MLTT is taken by the other two; if
this happens, she is supposed to select an action from
the set CMLS [ CMLT , i.e. she is allowed to perform
singularly the project by accepting MLTS .
The game is solved backwards, by starting from the
analysis of the lending schemes at t = 3.
V. INDIVIDUAL LENDING
Consider the case where at most one entrepreneur
plays T at t = 2; all entrepreneurs stay alone and
the microlender implements IL at t = 3. Since the
entrepreneurs are not endowed with assets to be put up as
collateral, the pair of loan contracts, one for each type
of entrepreneur, proposed by the microlender contains
only a price component: when the project succeeds
the entrepreneurs have to repay a nonnegative amount
R6A,  = H;L, whereas if returns are zero nothing is
repaid. A limited liability constraint is hence specied.
Without loss of generality we can design IL as fol-
lows. The microlender chooses IL1 = fRHg and IL2 =
fRLg to maximize total prots of the entrepreneurs for
he represents a no-prot organization, provided that his
participation constraint and the entrepreneurs' limited
liability plus self-selection constraints are satised:
max
R
4X
i=1
p i (A R i) (1)
7s.t.
4X
i=1
p iR i>4;
06R6A
A RH>A RL (ICH )
p (A RL)>p (A RH) (ICL)
where ICH(L) is the self-selection constraint of type
H(L). Remark that entrepreneurs' participation is im-
plied by limited liability for their outside option is zero:
this holds throughout the paper.
Lemma 1 If IL is implemented, then IL1 = IL2 =
fR = =pMg, where pM = (1 + p) =2. Type 
entrepreneur accepts contract fRg and ends
up with p (A  =pM ).
Solution to (1) is pooling, i.e. the same repayment
R = =pM is charged to both types, where pM is the
average probability of success computed by taking into
account microlender's prior beliefs, which he is not able
to update: m( i = H) = m( i = L) = 1=2. Note
that p < pM < 1: bad entrepreneurs, who repay with
probability p, are charged a lower interest rate than the
one they would pay with symmetric information, as good
entrepreneurs produce an effect of cross-subsidization.
VI. PRODUCTION TEAM LENDING
Consider now the case where all entrepreneurs play T
at t = 2: one or two teams are built and the microlender
implements PT L. The fact that the entrepreneurs are
disposed to form teams enables the microlender to add a
non-price component to the pair of loan contracts PTLA
and PTLB; such a component consists of a technology.
Contract PTLA requires the teams to adopt a technol-
ogy for which expected output of a team with nH type
H entrepreneurs plus nL = 2  nH type L ones is
q (nH ; nL) 2A+ [1  q (nH ; nL)] 0. (2)
Let the probability of success q(nH ; nL) be increasing
in nH (and decreasing and in nL = 2   nH ). We refer
to this technology as technology A (henceforth AT ).
The contract also species a nonnegative repayment
2RAT62A due by the team as a whole only in the case of
success. We denote contract PTLA with fAT; 2RAT g.
Contract PTLB prescribes the use of a technology
which produces the following expected output:
r (nH ; nL) 2A+ [1  r (nH ; nL)] 0. (3)
Let the probability of success r(nH ; nL) be increasing
in nH (and decreasing and in nL = 2  nH ). This tech-
nology is denoted with B (henceforth BT ). The contract
also species a nonnegative repayment 2RBT62A due
by the team as a whole only in the case of success. We
indicate contract PTLB with fBT; 2RBT g.
With a slight abuse of notation, let h(nH ; nL) = hnH ,
where h(:) = q(:); r(:). Since the probability of success
of a good entrepreneur is equal to 1, it seems reasonable
to set q2 = r2 = 1, i.e. the probability of success of a
two-good-entrepreneur team is supposed to be equal to
1 for any technology. This hypothesis is not crucial but
simplies computations.
Assumption 1 0 < q0 < r0 < p (1 + 2r1)   2r1,
q1 < r1.
Assumption 1 implies p > r0; it hence states that the
probability of success of a team with two bad members
and AT is positive but lower than the corresponding
value when BT is adopted, which in turn is lower than
the probability of success of a single bad entrepreneur:
AT highly penalizes bad entrepreneurs. Figure 1 depicts
Technologies A and B as an O-ring technology (for
which expected output is increasing and convex in the
number of good members) and a linear one, respectively.
According to our assumptions, Technology A can also
be linear.8
FIGURE 1. EXAMPLES OF TECHNOLOGIES A AND B
output
BT
AT
1
2A
r12A
q12A
r02A
q02A
2 nH
Assumption 2 max f1; 2g6A=,
where 1 = [1 + 2r1   r0 (1 + 2q1)] = [2r0 (r1   q1)],
2 = [3  p (1 + 2r1)] = [p (2  2r1)] and
8When two entrepreneurs form a team, their contributions are
assumed to be perfectly correlated: either the whole project succeeds
and A + A is the cash ow, or zero is produced. Technologies A and
B differ in the probability of success they assign to the team. We
design such a probability in a exible way: for instance, a team
made by two bad entrepreneurs produces 2A with a probability not
necessarily equal to p. This exibility relies on the idea that the team
may perform a production activity which is different from the ones
the two entrepreneurs would have implemented if alone.
8min f1; 2g > 1. Assumption 2 states that output
A is big relatively to opportunity cost of capital and
implies pA > : this means that projects of both types
are socially protable because their expected output is
higher than the sum of microlender's and entrepreneurs'
reservation prots + 0.
We show how the microlender is able to induce the
two good, resp. bad, entrepreneurs to choose PTLA,
resp. PTLB , with the effect that two teams are formed
between peers.
When computing expected prot of entrepreneur i
who selects PTLA, resp. PTLB , two cases must be
taken into account: either entrepreneur i does not receive
funds (this occurs, for example, when the other three
selects PTLB , resp. PTLA) or she ends up by forming
a team which adopt Technology A, resp. B (this occurs,
for example, when the other three selects PTLA, resp.
PTLB , as well). The rst case is trivial as entrepreneur i
gets zero for any choice of the contract. We hence focus
on the second case. Recalling that each entrepreneur is
entitled to an amount 1=2 of team output, entrepreneur
i's expected prot, if  i = H , is
(A RAT ) [i ( i = H j i = H ) 1+
i ( i = L j i = H ) q1] = (A RAT )

1
3
+
2
3
q1

when selecting PTLA. Indeed, according to the interim
beliefs, the probability that she teams up with a peer is
1=3, in which case the team succeeds with probability
1, whereas the mate is type L with probability 2=3,
in which case the team's success probability is q1.
Similarly,
(A RBT )

1
3
+
2
3
r1

is expected prot of a good entrepreneur when choosing
PTLB and
(A RAT )

1
3
q0 +
2
3
q1

(A RBT )

1
3
r0 +
2
3
r1

are expected prots of a bad entrepreneur when selecting
PTLA and PTLB , respectively.
If
(A RAT )
 
1
3 +
2
3q1

> (A RBT )
 
1
3 +
2
3r1

;
(A RBT )
 
1
3r0 +
2
3r1

> (A RAT )
 
1
3q0 +
2
3q1

;
(4)
then, from one hand, both good entrepreneur prefer
PTLA; from the other hand both bad ones prefer PTLB;
as a consequence, two teams arise between peers.9
If PTLA and PTLB satisfy (4), any entrepreneur i
and the microlender are thus able to update their beliefs
by anticipating correctly that  i = H , resp. L, if  i
chooses PTLA, resp. PTLB . In symbols:
i ( i = H (L) j i chooses PTLA (PTLB)) = 1
m ( i = H (L) j i chooses PTLA (PTLB)) = 1
for any entrepreneur i and the microlender, respectively.
With no loss of generality, PT L can be summarized
as follows. The microlender sets RBT to maximize
prots of the two-bad-entrepreneur team on contract
PTLB , subject to his participation constraint, to zero
prot condition on contract PTLA, to limited liability
and, nally, to (4):
max
2RBT
r0 (2A  2RBT ) (5)
s.t.
r02RBT>2;
2RAT = 2;
062Rj62A;
2 (r1   q1)A+ (1 + 2q1)RAT
1 + 2r1
6RBT6
[r0   q0 + 2 (r1   q1)]A+ (q0 + 2q1)RAT
r0 + 2r1
;
where j = AT;BT . Taking into account that zero-prot
condition on contract PTLA gives RAT = A, (5) can
be rewritten as
max
RBT
r0 (2A  2RBT ) (6)
s.t.
max

2 (r1   q1)A+ (1 + 2q1) 
1 + 2r1
;

r0

6RBT6
[r0   q0 + 2 (r1   q1)]A+ (q0 + 2q1) 
r0 + 2r1
:
Under Assumptions 1 and 2 solution to program (6) is
separating:
2RAT = 2 < 2R

BT = 2
2 (r1   q1)A+ (1 + 2q1) 
1 + 2r1
:
9The assumption of contractibility of the technology is not cru-
cial to our analysis. Indeed, remarking that the rst inequality
of (4) implies RAT < RBT given Assumption 1, (4) could be
rewritten as
(A RAT )
 
1
3
+ 2
3
q1

> (A RAT )
 
1
3
+ 2
3
r1
  F;
(A RBT )
 
1
3
r0 +
2
3
r1

> (A RAT )
 
1
3
r0 +
2
3
r1
  F;
if the choice of technology was observed by the microlender only
after the contract is signed and F was a ne charged to the teams
when they adopt technology B after selecting contract PTLA.
9Lemma 2 If PT L is implemented, two teams
arise between peers for the two good, resp.
the two bad, entrepreneurs select contract
PTLA = fAT; 2RAT g, resp. PTLB =
fBT; 2RBT g. Each good entrepreneur, resp.
bad, ends up with A   , resp. with
r0 (1 + 2q1) (A  ) = (1 + 2r1).
The microlender is able to discriminate between good
and bad clients. Indeed, each good entrepreneur chooses
contract PTLA = fAT; 2RAT g because the difference
in the repayments 2RBT  2RAT > 0 is sufciently high
to compensate the lower interim probability of success
under AT than under BT , i.e. 1=3 + (2=3) q1 < 1=3 +
(2=3) r1. Instead, each bad entrepreneur prefers contract
PTLB = fBT; 2RBT g because even if 2RBT > 2RAT ,
such a difference is sufciently small to be compensated
by the higher interim probability of success under BT
than under AT , (1=3) r0+(2=3) r1 > (1=3) q0+(2=3) q1.
VII. MIXED LENDING
Suppose now that at t = 2 two or three entrepreneurs
select T : one team is built in this case and the microlen-
der offers ML, which consists of a pair of contracts.
The rst one, MLT = fBT; 2RBT 0g, is addressed to
the team and requires it to adopt technology B for which
expected output of a team with nH type H entrepreneurs
plus nL = 2   nH type L ones is described by (3).
The contract also contains a nonnegative repayment
2RBT 062A due by the team as a whole only in the
case of success. The second contract, MLS = fR1g,
is designed for the single entrepreneurs and species a
nonnegative repayment R16A due by them only whether
successful.
We show how the microlender is able to induce the
two good, resp. bad, entrepreneurs to chooseMLT , resp.
MLS , with the effect that the team is built between
good peers and the two type L entrepreneurs perform
the project individually.
If a good entrepreneur gets MLTT (according to the
design of the Mixed Lending subgame, playing T is
sufcient to get MLT only if two entrepreneurs make
such a choice), her expected prot is
(A RBT 0) [i ( i = H j i = H ) 1+
i ( i = L j i = H ) r1] = (A RBT 0)

1
3
+
2
3
r1

:
On the contrary, her prot is A   R1 when get-
ting MLTS .10 Corresponding values for a type L are
10Playing S is sufcient to get MLS for any choice of the other
entrepreneurs.
(A RBT 0) ((1=3) r0 + (2=3) r1) and p (A R1), re-
spectively.
If 
(A RBT 0)
 
1
3 +
2
3r1

>A R1;
p (A R1)> (A RBT 0)
 
1
3r0 +
2
3r1

;
(7)
the two good entrepreneurs select T at t = 2 and get
MLT at t = 3, whereas choice of each bad one are S and
MLS . As a consequence, the team is built between good
peers and the two type L stay alone. If MLT and MLS
satisfy (7), any entrepreneur i and the microlender are
thus able to update their beliefs by anticipating correctly
that  i = H , resp. L, if  i chooses MLT , resp. MLS .
ML is designed as follows. The microlender sets R1
to maximize prots of the bad single entrepreneurs on
contract MLS , subject to his participation constraint,
to zero prot condition on contract MLT , to limited
liability and, nally, to (7):
max
R1
2p (A R1) (8)
s.t.
2pR1>2;
2RBT 0 = 2;
062RBT 062A;
06R16A;
(2  2r1)A+ (1 + 2r1)RBT 0
3
6R16 
p  13r0   23r1

A+
 
1
3r0 +
2
3r1

RAT
p
:
Under Assumptions 1 and 2 solution to program (8)
is separating:
2RBT 0 = 2;R

1 =
(2  2r1)A+ (1 + 2r1) 
3
;
where RBT 0 < R

1 under Assumption 2.
Lemma 3 If ML is implemented, the team arises
with the two good entrepreneurs for they both
select contract MLT = fBT; 2RBT 0g: each
member ends up with A   . The two bad
entrepreneurs select MLS = fR1g and get
p (1 + 2r1) (A  ) =3.
Again the microlender ends up by discriminating
between good and bad clients. Indeed, each good entre-
preneur chooses contractMLT = fBT; 2RBT 0g because
the disparity in the repayments R1   RBT 0 > 0 is suf-
ciently high to compensate the difference between the
success probability when each entrepreneur stays alone
and the interim success probability under BT , i.e. 1 >
1=3+(2=3) r1. Instead, the two bad entrepreneur prefers
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contract MLS = fR1g because even if R1 > RBT 0 ,
such a difference is sufciently small to be compensated
by the disparity between the success probability when
each entrepreneur stays alone and the interim success
probability under BT , p > (1=3) r0 + (2=3) r1.
VIII. EQUILIBRIUM
In this section we solve the two-stage Bayesian game
played by the entrepreneurs at t = 2; 3.
PROPOSITION 1 Under Assumptions 1 and 2 the two-
stage Bayesian game played by the entrepre-
neurs at t = 2; 3 admits the following pure-
strategy PBE: at t = 2 the two good entrepre-
neurs play T , while the two bad ones play S; at
t = 3 the two-good-entrepreneur team adopts
technology B and repays with probability 1,
while the two single bad entrepreneurs repay
with probability p < 1.
PROOF See the Appendix.
If good entrepreneurs form a team between them the
microlender implements eitherML or PT L, which are
both screening mechanisms. The deriving disclosure of
information makes him able to reduce the repayment
charged to type H entrepreneurs. In such a case the bad
entrepreneurs are no more cross-subsidized by the good
ones and prefer to stay alone for they would fail more
often if they teamed up.
Our results suggest that targeting teams is a good
lending strategy when no collateral is required, and, as it
occurs in urban areas, networks of local information and
social sanctions are weak. Teams repay with higher prob-
ability because they are made by good entrepreneurs;
this, in turn, is due to the fact that each member has
strong incentives to join good mates in order to increase
her revenues.
Data contained in Table 2 do not support a clear
evidence that associations and cooperatives served by
the MAGs perform activities which involve sophisticated
production processes. It is hence reasonable to identify
them as teams that adopt Technology B. In such a
case, the PBE offers an explanation of the Table 1's
ndings by suggesting that teams turn out to be less
risky because they count only good entrepreneurs, while
single entrepreneurs are type L.
IX. CONCLUSION
Poor local information networks and weak social sanc-
tions in urban developed areas make joint liability unable
to guarantee high repayment rates to microlenders. Yet,
microcredit programmes in Western Europe report a
good degree of nancial self-sufciency according to
NEF and Viganò, even if the majority of them requires
no collateral.
This paper proposes an alternative microcredit in-
strument that, like joint liability, is able to mitigate
informational problems in microcredit markets, but ts
the urban context, where social sanctions are too weak
to serve the role of collateral substitutes.
The analysis on loans granted by MAG2 Milano,
MAG4 Torino and MAG6 Reggio Emilia reveals that
teams (associations and cooperatives) repay more often
than individual entrepreneurs. On this basis, we develop
a model where two types of wealthless entrepreneurs,
who differs in their ability to repay, decide, before
applying for loans, whether (1) to perform the project
singularly, or (2) to be disposed to build production
teams. Loans consist of different lending schemes a
microlender proposes conditional on the entrepreneurs'
choice between alternatives (1) or (2).
At equilibrium only good entrepreneurs constitute
teams, whereas bad ones choose to stay alone and
repay with lower probability. Our ndings suggest that
targeting the former is a good lending strategy when no
collateral is put up and social sanctions are weak. Since
we are able to interpret associations and cooperatives as
teams that adopt technology B, then the data seem to
conrm that MAGs follow the above strategy: they set
aside 84% of the loans to teams, whereas only 16% to
single entrepreneurs. Furthermore, we suggest a possible
explanation, based on a screening mechanism, of the
evidence that, at least among MAGs' clients, teams are
less risky than single entrepreneurs.
While the joint liability practice emphasizes social
liaisons among entrepreneurs who belong to the same
group but perform different projects, our instrument
attracts persons who desire to work at the same project:
their cohesion is based on a prot-maximizing behavior.
We believe that this aspect may overcome problems
of poor informational networks and weak social ties,
thereby making such an instrument more suitable to the
needs of microlenders and entrepreneurs who populate
urban areas.
Possible extensions of the current analysis may in-
clude a market with a continuum of entrepreneurs, re-
turns of type H ones which second-order dominate those
of type L and teams with size greater than n = 2.
X. APPENDIX
Proof of Proposition 1. We check whether the follow-
ing prole of pure strategies is PBE of the two-stage
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Bayesian game:
(T;RMLT ) j i = H ; (9)
(S;RMLS) j i = L :
The above prole represents a situation where any
entrepreneur i chooses (a) T at t = 2 and RMLT at
t = 3 if i = H , (b) S at t = 3 and RMLS at t = 3 if
i = L. This means that a two-type H-entrepreneur team
is built and the two type L entrepreneurs stay alone:
ML is then implemented and, according to Lemma
3, any entrepreneur i ends up with (A   ), resp.
p (1 + 2r1) (A  ) =3, if  i = H , resp. L.
There are 22  1 deviations available to any entrepre-
neur i at t = 2. First suppose deviation (T; T ) is played,
where the rst, resp. second, action indicates the one
selected by any entrepreneur i when  i = H , resp. L. In
this case ML is implemented. If entrepreneur i is type
H , a two-type H-entrepreneur team is built and the two
type L stay alone. If entrepreneur i is type L, either (i) a
two-type H-entrepreneur team is built and the two type
L stay alone, or (ii) the team is built between different
types, while a type H and a type L stay alone. If
2 (A RBT 0) (1  r1) > (A R1) (1  p) (10)
then the sum of entrepreneurs' prots is higher under
situation (i). Condition (10) is compatible with our pre-
vious assumptions. We hence make a further hypothesis:
if the above deviation is played by any entrepreneur i,
the microlender denies MLT to her when  i = L, so
that the team arises between good peers, which turns
out to be efcient if (10) is veried. We can conclude
that when deviation (T; T ) is played, entrepreneur i gets
(A  ) when  i = H and p (1 + 2r1) (A  ) =3 when
 i = L.
Consider now deviations (S; T ) and (S; S): if entre-
preneur i is type H , then all entrepreneurs stay alone,
IL is implemented and entrepreneur i gets (A  =pM )
by selecting RIL1=IL2 . If entrepreneur i is type L, then
ML is implemented. According to the above reasoning,
one team with two type H entrepreneurs is built and the
two type L entrepreneurs stay alone: entrepreneur i gets
p (1 + 2r1) (A  ) =3.
Notice that all the payoffs from deviations are not
higher than the ones obtained by playing (9): since
no strictly protable deviations are available to any
entrepreneur i, we can conclude that (9) is a PBE of
the game.
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